Working papers

Physical vs. Institutional Public Goods Provision: Evidence from China (Job Market PaperR&R)

Abstract: This paper argues that the level of political and market concentration explains why developing economies often underinvest in institutional infrastructure and legal capacity. Economic growth challenges this equilibrium and incentivizes rulers to invest in institutional infrastructure complementary to physical infrastructure. Rulers make joint investments to expand market entry and size if they can secure greater rents and preserve institutions favoring concentration. Using provincial shares of the national coal reserve as an instrument for market concentration levels, a difference-in-difference analysis of Chinese data from 1997 to 2006 demonstrates that the fiscal expenditure ratio of physical to institutional infrastructure rose 78% faster in provinces with market concentration indexes in the top quartile in 2000 (the year before China acceded to the World Trade Organization). The paper also presents a theoretical model that proposes that investment in physical infrastructure increases faster than in institutional infrastructure when market concentration levels increase.

Protecting Property Rights under State Ownership: Evidence from China (Full text available upon requests)

Abstract: My job market paper shows that monopoly matters for investment in institutions. The subsequent question is why this is the case. This paper provides evidence suggesting that monopoly serves as the de facto institution for protecting private property rights in the absence of formal ones. Unlike in capitalist economies, high-skilled workers in communist economies exhibit a preference for the state sector even in the absence of wage premiums. Analysis of Chinese data from 1992 to 2006 reveals that high-skilled workers are motivated to work in the state sector not primarily for wage differentials (and sometimes not at all for high-skilled managers), but rather for rent differentials. These differentials are measured by the asset per employee ratio, which can reach as high as 26.6 percent for high-skilled managers, in the state sector compared to the non-state sector. Higher-skilled workers join the state sector for better positions with richer monopoly rents and higher capacity protecting them from being taken away.

Negative shocks, Political Collectivity, and State Capacity: Evidence from China (Abstract and full text available upon request)

Work in Progress

Social Norms, Family Structure and Political Regime: Evidence from China

The Origin of Corporations with Limited Liability in Family Structure: Evidence from China

Publications