Physical vs. Institutional Public Goods Provision: Evidence from China (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: This paper argues that market concentration level explains why developing economies often under-invest in institutional infrastructure and legal capacity. Economic growth challenges this equilibrium and incentivizes rulers to invest in institutional infrastructure complementary to physical infrastructure. Rulers make joint investments to expand market entry and size if they can secure greater rents and preserve institutions favoring concentration. Instrumenting market concentration level with the share of the coal mining industry in local industrial output, the difference-in-differences analysis of Chinese data from 1997 to 2006 shows that the fiscal expenditure ratio of physical to institutional infrastructure rose 42% faster in provinces with market concentration indexes in the top quartile in 2000 (the year before China acceded to the World Trade Organization). The paper also presents a theoretical model proposing that investment in physical infrastructure rises faster than institutional infrastructure when the market concentration level increases.
Protecting Property Rights under State Ownership: Evidence from China (available upon requests)
Abstract: My job market paper shows that monopoly matters for investment in institutions. The next question is why. This paper presents evidence for an answer that monopoly is the de facto institution protecting property rights absent formal ones. Under state ownership, workers choose to work in the state sector to share the monopoly rents. Using the Chinese data from 1992 to 2006, the paper finds that high-skilled workers work for the state sector much less for wage differentials (even not at all for high-skilled managers) than the low-skilled workers but more for rent differentials which can be as high as 26 percent for high-skilled managers. Higher-skilled workers join the state sector for better positions with richer rents accessible and higher capacity protecting them from being taken away.
Work in Progress
Negative Shocks and State Capacity: Evidence from China
Social Norms, Family Institutions, and Political Regimes: Evidence from China
Gender and Off-Farm Employment: Evidence from Rural China (with Xiaobing Wang, Jikun Huang, Linxiu Zhang, and Scott Rozelle), China & World Economy, 2016, Vol.24 No.3, 18-36.
Incentives and Management in the Fiscal Reform in China Towns (with Renfu Luo, Linxiu Zhang, Chengfang Liu, Christine Wong, and Scott Rozelle) (in Chinese), China Journal of Economics, 2014, Vol.1 No.1, 1-17.
The Link between Credit Markets and Self-Employment Choice among Households in Rural China (with Denise Hare), Journal of Asian Economics, 2013, Vol.26 No.C, 52-64.
Fiscal Pressure from Population Aging in Developed Economies (in Chinese), Economic Research and Management, 2013, No.6.
Optimal Liquidity and Macroeconomic Stability (with Il Houng Lee), IMF Working Paper, 2012, No.135.
Fiscal Risk in Euro Area (with Guoqi Wu, in Chinese), China Public Finance, 2011, No.3.
The Financial Crisis and China's Future Growth” (with Li Qi), China Currents, 2008, Vol.7, No.3.
Fiscal Policy Options for Rural Collaborative Economic Organization (in Chinese), China Public Finance, 2007, No.10.
On the Reform of the Chinese Banking System and Financial Development (in Chinese), Economic Research and Management, 2006, No.6.
Financial Structure in Economic Development (in Chinese), Journal of Capital University of Economics and Trade, 2006, No.5.
Transition Economy, Soft Budget, and Fiscal Decentralization (in Chinese), Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, 2006, No.2.
Several Patterns in Current Global Capital Flow (in Chinese), Macroeconomic Management, 2005, No.6.
On the Theory of Financial Development: An overview (in Chinese), Economic Perspective, 2003, No.2.
Financial Structure and the Efficiency of Financial System (in Chinese), Economic Science, 2001, No.2.